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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the implications of monetary policy rules for
exchange rate dynamics. I extend a standard New Open Economy
Macroeconomics model with the introduction of a simple money
supply rule, whereby central banks change their monetary policy
if output diverges from potential output or if inflation diverges
from  the  target  inflation.  A  key  result  is  that,  in  the  case  of
permanent technology and monetary shocks, the nominal
exchange rate does not follow a random walk; instead, the
exchange rate undershoots its long-run value. An undershooting
of the exchange rate derives from the active monetary policy that
both countries conduct.
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1 Introduction
In the world that existed before the global ?nancial crisis, interest rate rules,
especially the Taylor rule, dominated the debate and research on monetary
policy. During the ?nancial crisis, however, the consequences of an increase
in the money supply have returned the monetary policy debate due to the
two rounds of quantitative easing implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve.
An important question about this monetary policy is not only its ability to
stimulate the economy, but also its impact on the external value of the dollar.
Since the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods system of ?xed exchange
rates in 1973, the era of ?oating currencies has been associated with large
exchange rate ?uctuations. The determination of ?oating exchange rates has
been one of the main areas of research in international economics. Reasons
for the high volatility of exchange rates have attracted much attention.
Two broad classes of theories have been developed to explain large ex-
change rate ?uctuations. Since the publication of the ?overshooting model? by
Dornbusch (1976), one strand of the exchange rate literature has developed
sticky price monetary models, which could account for large ?uctuations in
exchange rates that would be consistent with the rational expectations hy-
pothesis.1 An alternative and popular view is that the main cause for large
exchange rate ?uctuations is destabilising speculation (see e.g. Krugman
2002).
One of the most important determinants of the nominal exchange rate
is the relative money supply. In the traditional monetary approach to the
exchange rate, the classical exercise to carry out is to analyse the e¤ects of
an unexpected permanent increase in the money supply. In the overshooting
models of Betts and Devereux (2001), Dornbusch (1976) and Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1996, Appendix), an increase in the money supply induces an im-
mediate jump in the nominal exchange rate, which is followed by a gradual
movement over time to the new level. As emphasised e.g. by Dornbusch
and Frankel (1995) and by Frydman and Goldberg (2007), the overshooting
model(s) cannot explain why exchange rates also tend to undergo gradual
swings away from benchmark levels.
Empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the exchange rate over-
shooting hypothesis. As emphasised by Bjørnland (2009), empirical studies
of monetary policy have typically found exchange rate e¤ects that are incon-
sistent with overshooting. Instead, they have found support for the view that
the response of the exchange rate is only gradual. Thus, that in the short
run, the exchange rate undershoots its long run value. Bjørnland (2009), on
the other hand, ?nds support for the overshooting hypothesis.
Papell (1984) shows that accommodative monetary policy can switch from
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exchange rate overshooting to undershooting. He develops a two-country
version of the Dornbusch model, in which the domestic and foreign money
supply are endogenously determined. The central banks in both countries
follow simple money supply rules, so that the money supply depends on both
the exchange rate and the di¤erence between domestic and foreign prices. In
his framework, a monetary policy that tries to o¤set exchange rate move-
ments and accommodates price movements can be interpreted as an attempt
to stabilise output. The author shows that an active monetary policy that
accommodates price movements can cause exchange rate undershooting.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the undershooting result
of Papell (1984) is valid in an optimising framework. To address this ques-
tion, the standard New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)2 model
is extended with the introduction of a hypothetical money supply rule that
captures the main idea of the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). The monetary policy
rule proposed here assumes that central banks in both countries change the
money supply if the actual level of output diverges from the potential level
of output, or if the actual rate of in?ation diverges from the target rate of
in?ation.
The main result of this paper is that Papell?s (1984) conclusion that
money supply rules can cause exchange rate undershooting is valid in an
optimising framework. If the level of technology improves, or if a country
faces a monetary shock, then the nominal exchange rate does not follow a
random walk. If the exchange rate models of Betts and Devereux (2001),
Dornbusch (1976) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Appendix) can account
for a long swing towards the new long-run level, the present model provides
an explanation of a long swing away from the benchmark level.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 discusses the implications of monetary policy rules for
exchange rate dynamics. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, I develop a standard two-country NOEM model that is based
on Betts and Devereux (2000). They modi?ed the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model by
assuming that a fraction of ?rms set their prices in the customer?s currency.
However, I focus exclusively on the traditional producer currency pricing
(PCP) case, assuming that prices are rigid in the producer?s currency. I ex-
tend the Betts-Devereux model in three ways. Firstly, I assume that central
banks follow a hypothetical monetary policy rule whereby they change mone-
tary policy if the actual level of output or in?ation diverges from their target
2
levels. Secondly, I introduce a Calvo-type staggered price setting. Thirdly, I
introduce shocks to the production function.3
2.1 Country Size and Market Structure
The world consists of two countries, home and foreign. There is a continuum
of ?rms and households that are indexed by ? 2 [0? 1]. A fraction ? of them
is domestic; 1¡? is foreign. Each ?rm produces a di¤erentiated commodity.
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the repre-
sentative domestic household is given by4
?? (?) =
1X
?=?
??¡?
"
log?? + ? log
µ
??
??
¶
¡ ?? (?)
2
2
#
? (1)
Here ? is the discount factor, ?? is a private consumption index (de?ned
below), ?? denotes nominal balances, ?? indicates the consumer price in-
dex (de?ned below), and ? denotes the labour supply of household ?. The
consumption index is
? =
·Z 1
0
?(?)
?¡1
? ??
¸ ?
?¡1
?
where ?(?) is the consumption of commodity ?? and ? (? 1) is the elasticity of
substitution between di¤erentiated goods. The consumer price index (CPI)
is5
?? =
·Z ?
0
?? (?)
1¡? ?? +
Z 1
?
(???? (?))
1¡? ??
¸ 1
1¡?
? (2)
Prices ? represent domestic currency prices, prices ? foreign currency prices,
and ? is the exchange rate (the domestic currency price of foreign currency).
Thus, ?? (?) is the domestic currency price of the commodity, and ?? (?) is
the domestic currency price of the foreign commodity.
2.2.2 Budget Constraints and First-Order Conditions
The budget constraint of the representative domestic household is
?? + ???? = ??¡1 +??¡1 + ???? ¡ ???? +¦? + ??? ?? (3)
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Here ?? is the nominal price of a bond (?? = (1 + ??)
¡1, where ? is the nom-
inal domestic interest rate), ?? denotes bonds held by the household at the
beginning of period ?, ? is the nominal wage, ¦ denotes the nominal pro?ts
(dividends) of domestic ?rms, and ? denotes transfers from the government.
The only internationally traded asset is a riskless nominal bond, denominated
in domestic currency. Thus, the budget constraint of foreign households is
?¤? + ??
?¤?
??
=
?¤?¡1
??
+?¤?¡1 + ?
¤
? ?
¤
? ¡ ? ¤? ?¤? +¦¤? + ? ¤? ? ¤? ? (4)
The global asset-market-clearing condition requires ??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? = 0.
The ?rst-order conditions are
????+1??+1 = ?????? (5)
???
¤
?+1?
¤
?+1??+1 = ??
¤
? ?
¤
???? (6)
?? =
??
????
? (7)
?¤? =
?¤?
?¤? ? ¤?
? (8)
??
??
=
???
1¡ ?? ? (9)
? ¤?
? ¤?
=
??¤?
1¡ ????+1??
? (10)
Equations (5) and (6) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and for-
eign consumption, respectively. Equations (7) and (8) govern the optimal
labour supply, which is an increasing function of the real wage and a de-
creasing function of consumption. Equations (9) and (10) show that the
demand for money is an increasing function of consumption and a decreasing
function of the interest rate.
2.3 Monetary Policy
2.3.1 Money Supply Shocks
The NOEM literature, pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), has often
modelled monetary policy in terms of the central bank?s control of the money
supply. The standard analysis of monetary policy is to study the international
e¤ects of an unexpected permanent increase in the domestic money supply.
A salient feature of NOEM models is that the foreign central bank does
not react to the domestic policy expansion. In this basic case, the money
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supply follows a ?rst-order autoregressive process that can be described by
the following equation
?^? = ?^?¡1 + ?????? (11)
where percentage changes from the initial steady state are denoted by hats,
and ????? is an unpredictable shift in the money supply. Shocks to this equa-
tion are referred to as money supply shocks.
Since the publication of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), a new strand of the
literature has analysed monetary policy feedback rules in the face of produc-
tivity shocks.6 The object is to ?nd the optimal money supply rules that
maximise welfares. This type of analysis could be referred to as ?normative
analysis of monetary policy?. In this study, I do not presume this type of
optimisation by central banks; instead I assume that central banks follow a
monetary policy that tries to capture the spirit of the Taylor rule (Taylor
1993). This type of ?positive analysis of monetary policy? presents an alter-
native approach to those of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) and related work.
2.3.2 Simple Money Supply Rule
As emphasised by Woodford (2003, Chapter 1), theoretical analyses of mon-
etary policy have, until recently, virtually always modelled monetary policy
in terms of a path for the money supply, and discussions of monetary policy
rules have mainly considered money growth rules. In more recent analyses
of monetary policy, policy is described in terms of rules setting a nominal
interest rate.
In this study I make use of a simple money supply rule that tries to
capture the spirit of the Taylor rule. The Taylor rule can be written as
follows:
?? = ? + ?? + ??(?? ¡ ??? ) + ??(?? ¡ ¹??? )? (12)
Strictly speaking, this rule has the feature that the central bank raises the
nominal interest rate (?) if in?ation (??) rises above the in?ation target (??? )
or if output (?) rises above potential output (¹??)? The coe¢cients ??? ?? are
positive, and ? is the equilibrium real interest rate (Taylor 1993).
In this study, I consider a monetarist variant of the Taylor rule, similar to
the rule used by Pierdzioch (2004). Assume, for the sake of argument, that
the domestic central bank follows the following log-linear money supply rule
(the foreign central bank follows an identical rule):
?^? = ¡?1(¢?^? ¡¢?^ ?? )¡ ?2(?^? ¡ ?^? ???? ) + ?^?? (13)
In this equation, the coe¢cients ?1 and ?2 are non-negative and chosen by
the central banks. In addition, ¢ denotes the ?rst di¤erence operator, ¢?^ ??
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is the in?ation target and ¢?^? is in?ation, and ?^? is an unpredictable shift
in the money supply rule. Following new Keynesian closed economy models
(see e.g. Gali 2003), I de?ne the output gap (?^? ¡ ?^? ???? ) as the deviation of
output from its equilibrium level in the absence of nominal rigidities. Shock
to equation (13) are referred to as shocks to the monetary policy rule.
In NOEM models, however, current account imbalances imply permanent
wealth changes that a¤ect the labour supply. Thus, the new equilibrium level
of output is not necessarily the same as the old equilibrium level of output
also in the case of monetary shocks. This de?nition of the output gap is
clearly not perfect since the output gap is not exactly zero in the steady
state. However, the output gap is virtually zero in the steady state, and
consequently the non-zero output gap in the steady state is likely to have a
negligible e¤ect on the results. Finally, in the absence of a growth path for
the money supply, the in?ation target is zero.
The unpredictable shift in the money supply rule ? a monetary policy
shock ? can be caused by a change in the loss function of the central bank.
For example, if the loss function changes such that the central bank adopts a
more in?ationary monetary policy, it can be thought to be a positive shock
to the money supply rule. The shock to the money supply rule follows an
AR(1) process
?^? = ??^?¡1 + ??????
where ? governs the persistence of a money supply rule shock, and ????? is an
unpredictable shift in the money supply rule. In the exercise that I carry out
in this paper, shocks to the money supply rule are permanent (? = 1).
Finally, I abstract from government spending so the transfers to house-
holds are given by
? ? =
?? ¡ ??¡1
??
? (14)
2.4 Firms
2.4.1 Technology and Pro?ts
Each ?rm produces a di¤erentiated commodity. The production function of
domestic ?rm ? is
?? (?) = ???? (?) ? (15)
where ?? (?) is the total output of ?rm ?, ?? is the level of technology, and
?? (?) denotes the labour input used by ?rm ?. Technology shocks are country
speci?c, and technology is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
?^? = ?^?¡1 + ????? (16)
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where ???? is an unpredictable shift in the level of domestic technology. Firms
minimise costs ???? (?) subject to the above technology. The nominal mar-
ginal cost is
???(?) =
??
??
? (17)
As mentioned, I use the PCP assumption. The pro?ts of domestic and
foreign ?rms, respectively, are given by
¦? (?) = ?? (?) ?? (?)¡ ???? (?) ? (18)
¦¤? (?) = ?? (?) ?
¤
? (?)¡ ?¤? ?¤? (?)? (19)
The demands for the products are given by
?? (?) =
µ
?? (?)
??
¶¡?
(??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? ) ? (20)
?¤? (?) =
µ
?? (?)
? ¤?
¶¡?
(??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? ) ? (21)
2.4.2 Price Setting
In the absence of nominal rigidities, domestic ?rms would maximise ??(?)
with respect to ??(?). This would imply
?? (?) =
?
? ¡ 1??? (?) ? (22)
So the price of the commodity would be a constant mark-up over the
marginal cost.
In the short run prices are sticky, and I consider a discrete-time version of
the model of Calvo (1983). Each ?rm resets its prices with a probability 1¡?
in each period, independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment
and of other ?rms. When setting its pro?t-maximising price, each ?rm has to
take into account the 0 ? ? ? 1 probability that in every subsequent period
it will not be able to revise its price-setting decision. When setting a new
price in period ?, each ?rm seeks to maximize the present value of pro?ts,
weighting future pro?ts by the probability that the price will still be in e¤ect
in that period.
Domestic ?rms seek to maximise
max
??(?)
?? (?) =
1X
?=?
??¡?? ????? (?) ?
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where ???? = ¦
?
?=? (1 + ??)
¡1 is the domestic discount factor between period ?
and period ?. The pricing rule for domestic ?rms is
?? (?) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡????? (??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? )
³
1
??
´¡?
???P1
?=? ?
?¡????? (??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? )
³
1
??
´¡? ? (23)
Foreign ?rms maximise their pro?ts analogously. The pricing rule for
foreign ?rms is
?? (?) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤??? (??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? )
³
1
? ¤?
´¡?
??¤?P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤??? (??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? )
³
1
?¤?
´¡? ? (24)
2.4.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
All ?rms in a country are symmetric, and every ?rm that changes its prices
in any given period chooses the same output and prices. In each period a
fraction of ?rms, 1¡?? set new prices while the remaining fraction keep their
prices unchanged.
Equations (14) and (18) can be substituted into (3) to derive the con-
solidated budget constraint of the domestic economy. Making use of the
global asset market-clearing condition, the consolidated budget constraint of
the foreign economy can be calculated analogously. The consolidated budget
constraints can be written as
???? = ??¡1 + ?? (?) ?? (?)¡ ????? (25)
¡ ?
1¡ ???
??
??
= ¡ ?
1¡ ?
??¡1
??
+ ?? (?) ?¤? (?)¡ ? ¤? ?¤? ? (26)
Following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), the model is log-linearised around a
symmetric steady state where initial net foreign assets are zero. Equations
(7), (15)7 and (22) imply that
?0 = ?0 =
µ
? ¡ 1
?
¶1
2
?
where the subscript zero on variables denotes the initial steady state.
The log-linearisation is implemented by expressing the model in terms of
percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Those variables whose
initial steady state value is zero are normalised by consumption. Equilibrium
is sequences of variables that clear the labour, goods and money markets,
satisfy the optimality conditions for consumption, satisfy the pricing rules
and satisfy the consolidated budget constraints.
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3 Money Supply Rules and the Nominal Ex-
change Rate
3.1 Parameterisation
The parameterisation of the model is the following. Periods are interpreted
as quarters, and thus the discount factor is set to 0.99. The elasticity of
substitution between di¤erentiated goods is 6. The Calvo parameter is set to
0.75, which implies an average price duration of four periods. The countries
are of equal size, so ? = 0?5.
In addition, parameter values for ?1 and ?2 are needed. The ?ndings
of Taylor (1993) suggest that deviations of output and in?ation from their
respective targets are equally important to the U.S. Federal Reserve when
setting the nominal interest rate. That is, Taylor estimated that ?? = ?? =
0?5. In the basic case, I assume that deviations of output and in?ation
from their targets are equally important to the central banks when monetary
policy is described in terms of a money supply rule. Thus, the basic choice
is ?1 = ?2 = 0?5.
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3.2 Shock to the Monetary Policy Rule
I begin by analysing the consequences of shocks to the monetary policy rule.
Under perfectly ?exible prices, a monetary shock does not a¤ect output
(?^? ???? = 0). In addition, as mentioned, in the absence of the growth path for
the money supply, the in?ation target is zero. Thus, the money supply rule
can be now written as
?^? = ¡?1¢?^? ¡ ?2?^? + ?^?? (27)
I assume a one percent unexpected (permanent) shock (????? = 1) to the
money supply rule.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of this shock. It is worth observing
that the ?gure shows only the ?rst ten periods and that it takes more than
ten periods to reach the new steady state. In the ?gure, the vertical axes
almost always show percentage deviations from the initial equilibrium. The
change in bond holdings is, however, expressed as a deviation from the initial
consumption, and in?ation in period ? is ?^? ¡ ?^?¡1. The domestic terms of
trade are de?ned as the relative price of domestic imports in terms of domestic
exports. Thus, the domestic terms of trade deteriorate if this index rises.
Panel (d) in Figure 1 shows that the nominal exchange rate depreciates
following a shock to the domestic money supply rule. The log-linear version
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of equation (10) can be subtracted for the log-linear version of equation
(9), and the fact that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in this model
(?^? = ?^? ¡ ?^ ¤? ) is used to obtain (the derivation of structural exchange
rate equations closely follows the textbook treatment of the Obstfeld-Rogo¤
model by Walsh 2003, Chapter 6.2)
?^? =
³
?^? ¡ ?^¤?
´
¡
³
?^? ¡ ?^¤?
´
¡ ?
³
?^?+1 ¡ ?^?
´
? (28)
where ? ´ ??(1 ¡ ?). The forward solution to equation (28), assuming no
speculative bubbles, is
?^? =
1
1 + ?
1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶? h³
?^?+? ¡ ?^ ¤?+?
´
¡
³
?^?+? ¡ ?^¤?+?
´i
? (29)
The log-linear version of equation (6) can be subtracted from equation
(5), yielding
?^? ¡ ?^¤? = ?^?+1 ¡ ?^¤?+1? (30)
This implies that the consumption di¤erential between the countries is con-
stant, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 1. Since PPP holds and the nominal
interest rate is equal in both countries, real interest rates are equal across
countries. Consumption growth, therefore, is equated across countries, as in
the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model. In the short run, the liquidity e¤ect of expansive
monetary policy decreases the world nominal interest rate, which increases
consumption. In addition, the depreciation of the exchange rate improves the
foreign terms of trade, increasing foreign consumption in the short run. After
the shock, domestic households accumulate net foreign assets. In the long
run, higher wealth allows domestic households to keep consumption above
output, while foreign households have to decrease consumption to service the
external debt.
Making use of equation (30) and the de?nition of ?, equation (29) becomes
?^? = ¡
³
?^? ¡ ?^¤?
´
+
1¡ ?
?
1X
?=0
??
³
?^?+? ¡ ?^¤?+?
´
? (31)
This equation shows that the equilibrium value of the exchange rate in pe-
riod ? depends on the consumption di¤erential between countries and the
current and future path of relative money supplies. In equation (31), the
discount factor, (1 ¡ ?)??, is equal to 1?(1 + ?). Future relative money
supplies are therefore discounted by the nominal interest rate. Since ra-
tional forward-looking households realise the nature of the shock, only the
discounted present value of relative money supplies matters (see also Walsh
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2003, Chapter 6.2). A permanent shock to the domestic money supply rule,
therefore, induces an immediate depreciation of the exchange rate, although
in the short run there is a decrease in the home country?s relative money
supply.
The exchange rate depreciation induces the traditional expenditure switch-
ing e¤ect in the short run. This lowers the relative price of domestic goods,
causing a shift in world demand towards domestic goods away from foreign
goods. This shift in world demand causes a boom in the domestic economy.
In addition, the exchange rate depreciation increases the domestic price level,
causing in?ation. Panel (f) of Figure 1 illustrates that due to in?ation and
the positive output gap, the domestic central bank tightens monetary pol-
icy immediately after the shock, despite the positive shock to the monetary
policy rule. When ?rms have an opportunity to reset their prices, domestic
goods become more expensive relative to foreign goods, and the expenditure
switching e¤ect peters out. The output gap becomes smaller, and the do-
mestic central bank gradually increases its money supply to the new level
consistent with the shock to the money supply rule.
The expenditure switching e¤ect causes de?ation and a fall in output
in the foreign country in the short run. Deviations of output and in?ation
from their respective targets force the foreign central bank to implement an
expansionary monetary policy. Thus, it expands the money supply in the
short run.
Furthermore, panel (d) in Figure 1 also illustrates that, unlike in the
Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, the nominal exchange rate does not jump immedi-
ately to its new long-run level; instead the exchange rate undershoots its
long-run level. The term undershooting (overshooting) refers to the case
where the exchange rate changes by less (more) in the short run than it does
in the long run when a shock hits the economy. An initial undershooting of
the exchange rate is caused by the active monetary policy that both central
banks conduct.
Denote ?^?+? = (?^?+? ¡ ?^¤?+?)¡ (?^?+? ¡ ?^¤?+?), then equation (28) implies
that the change in the exchange rate is
?^?+1 ¡ ?^? = ¡1?
³
?^? ¡ ?^?
´
? (32)
The equation for the exchange rate, (29), can be written as
?^? =
1
1 + ?
1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶?
?^? =
1
1 + ?
?^? +
?
1 + ?
1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶?
?^?+1+?? (33)
Substituting equation (33) into the right hand side of equation (32) and using
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the de?nition of ?^ implies
?^?+1¡?^? = ¡1?
"
?^? ¡ 1
1 + ?
?^? +
µ
?
1 + ?
¶µ
1
1 + ?
¶ 1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶? ³
?^?+1+? ¡ ?^ ¤?+1+?
´#
,
?^?+1 ¡ ?^? = ¡1?
"³
?^? ¡ ?^¤?
´
¡ 1
1 + ?
1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶? ³
?^?+1+? ¡ ?^ ¤?+1+?
´#
?
(34)
In this equation, the term
1
1 + ?
1X
?=0
µ
?
1 + ?
¶? ³
?^?+1+? ¡ ?^ ¤?+1+?
´
is referred to as the expected future value of the money supply di¤erential.
Equation (34) shows the dependence of the change in the exchange rate on
the interplay between the current (?^? ¡ ?^ ¤? ) and expected future values of
the money supply di¤erential. For instance, if the current value of the money
supply di¤erential is low relative to the expected future value of the di¤eren-
tial, then the exchange rate must depreciate (see also Walsh 2003, Chapter
6.2). As mentioned, in the short run, the domestic central bank tightens
monetary policy, and the opposite happens abroad. Thus, in the short run
?^ is temporarily low relative to ?^¤, and the exchange rate depreciates also
after the initial depreciation of the exchange rate. The exchange rate depre-
ciates until the current money supply di¤erential is equal to the expected
future value of the di¤erential.
The undershooting result is in contrast with most exchange rate models,
but consistent with Papell (1984). He has developed a two-country variable
output version of Dornbusch (1976), where the monetary authorities follow a
simple money supply rule, which depends on both the exchange rate and the
di¤erence between domestic and foreign prices. This rule is quite di¤erent
from the rule proposed in this paper. However, Papell?s rule implies that
monetary policy that accommodates price movements and o¤sets exchange
rate movements can be interpreted as attempting to stabilise output (Papell
1984).
The ?ndings of this paper generalise the results of Papell (1984): an ac-
tivist monetary policy can cause exchange rate undershooting. In Papell?s
model an increase in the domestic money supply depreciates the steady state
exchange rate and increases the domestic to foreign price ratio. The rule
implies that this causes the component of the domestic money supply that
responds to relative prices to decrease and the foreign money supply to in-
crease. In the terminology of the present model, this implies that there is a
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di¤erence between the current and the expected future value of the money
supply di¤erential. If monetary policy is su¢ciently accommodative, the in-
crease in the domestic steady state money supply induces a decrease in the
relative (domestic to foreign) money supply. Uncovered interest parity then
implies that the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign interest rate, which
is only consistent with expected exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, the
exchange rate must undershoot its new long-run level: it must depreciate to
a point where it will continue to depreciate.
The e¤ects of monetary shocks on the exchange rate have received consid-
erable attention in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature. The
standard result in the models based on PPP, such as the Obstfeld-Rogo¤
model (1995, 1996), is that there is no exchange rate overshooting. How-
ever, if PPP is violated by the introduction of non-traded goods (Hau 2000,
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995, Appendix) or local currency pricing (Betts and
Devereux 2001), then exchange rate undershooting can occur. In these mod-
els, the exchange rate undershoots if the consumption elasticity of money
demand (1??) is greater than one.
As emphasised by Lane (2001), for instance the intuition is the same as
that for the output elasticity of money demand in the Dornbusch model.
A high consumption elasticity of money demand means that the domestic
interest rate increases relative to the foreign interest rate. Since uncovered
interest rate holds, this is possible only if the exchange rate is expected to
depreciate. That is, the exchange rate must undershoot its long run value.
In this paper, I have shown that accommodative monetary policy can also
cause exchange rate undershooting in the model based on PPP, and in the
case where the consumption elasticity of money demand is smaller than or
equal to one.
Pierdzioch (2005) ?nds that noise traders, who trade in the foreign ex-
change market using a simple ?rule-of-thumb? when forecasting exchange rates
and fail to form rational exchange rate expectations, can cause a delayed over-
shooting (that is, undershooting in the short run) of the nominal exchange in
response to a permanent monetary shock. In this paper, I have shown that
accommodative monetary policy can cause exchange rate undershooting in
the model with rational exchange rate expectations.
3.3 Money Supply Shock versus a Shock to the Mon-
etary Policy Rule
In this section, I compare the e¤ects of a shock to the monetary policy rule
with the e¤ects of a simple money supply shock. The dotted lines in Figure
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2 show the e¤ects of a shock to the money supply rule, given by equation
(27). The solid lines show the e¤ects a money supply shock. That is, a
one percent increase in the domestic money supply (????? = 1), governed by
equation (11). So the solid lines depict the e¤ects to a monetary shock in
the basic Obstfeld-Rogo¤ (1995) case.
Figure 2 shows that the e¤ects of a shock to the money supply rule are
virtually the same as the e¤ects of a simple money supply shock. In panels
(a) - (d) it is di¢cult to see the dashed lines as the e¤ects of these shocks are
virtually the same in both cases. The only notable di¤erence between the
results is the undershooting of the exchange rate in the case where central
banks follow the money supply rules. As equations (31) and (34) show,
the exchange rate must follow a random walk if the money supply shock is
permanent.
The di¤erences in the other results stem from the expenditure switching
e¤ect that is driven by the short-run dynamics of the nominal exchange.
In the case of a shock to the monetary policy rule, the undershooting of
the nominal exchange rate implies somewhat weaker expenditure switching
e¤ect in the short run. Because the response of the nominal exchange rate
is quite identical in both cases in the short run, the expenditure switching
e¤ect causes only somewhat smaller increase (decrease) in domestic (foreign)
output in the case of a shock to the monetary policy rule than in the case of
a money supply shock.
3.4 Technology Shocks and Exchange Rate Dynamics
Since the publication of an in?uential paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982),
the proponents of Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory have supported the
view that technological changes are the driving force behind business cycles,
at least in developed countries. However, the NOEM literature has mostly fo-
cused on exchange rate dynamics caused by monetary or ?scal shocks and the
analysis of technology shocks has received much less attention. In addition,
a limitation of many NOEM models (including the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model,
1996) is that technology shocks are modelled as shocks to the parameter that
captures the disutility of labour. This is more a labour supply shock than
a technology shock, as Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, 699) themselves already
noted.
The next step is to examine the consequences of the money supply rules
on exchange rate dynamics in the face of technology shocks. Consider a
one percent unexpected increase in the level of domestic technology (???? =
1). Under perfectly ?exible prices, domestic output would increase almost
exactly by one percent with virtually no impact on foreign output. This
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implies e.g. that the domestic money supply rule in the case of technology
shock could be written as
?^? = ¡?1¢?^? ¡ ?2(?^? ¡ ?^?)? (35)
Panel (d) of Figure 3 illustrates that the nominal exchange rate appre-
ciates strongly after a domestic technology shock. A permanent increase in
the level of technology leads to a permanently higher level of output. This
translates into a higher level of consumption. Equation (31) demonstrates
that the relative increase in domestic consumption induces an appreciation
of the exchange rate.
The expenditure switching e¤ect of an exchange rate change causes a fall
in domestic output and a rise in foreign output in the short run. Domestic
goods become more expensive relative to foreign goods in both countries.
Consequently, world demand shifts towards foreign goods away from domestic
goods. This causes a negative output gap in the home country and a positive
one in the foreign country.
A part of the change in monetary policy derives from the deviations of
in?ation from the in?ation target. A technology shock decreases the marginal
costs of domestic ?rms, lowering the domestic price level. In addition, the
appreciation of the exchange rate decreases the domestic price level (recall
equation (2)). A technology shock, therefore, induces de?ation in the home
country. De?ation and the negative output gap implies that the domestic
central bank conducts an expansionary monetary policy until the economy
reaches the new steady state. In the foreign country, excess demand allows
foreign ?rms to raise their prices, and in addition, the appreciation of the
exchange rate causes import in?ation. The foreign central bank tightens
monetary policy to curb excess demand and in?ationary pressures.
The undershooting of the exchange rate derives from the monetary poli-
cies that the countries implement. As discussed earlier, in the short run the
domestic central bank loosens its monetary policy while the foreign central
bank tightens its monetary policy. In terms of equation (34), this means
that the current value of the money supply di¤erential is high relative to the
expected future value of this di¤erential. Therefore, the exchange rate ap-
preciates also after the initial response. The exchange rate must appreciate
until the current money supply di¤erential is equal to the expected future
value of the di¤erential.
A drawback of this analysis is that the output gap in non-zero is the
steady state. The reason is that the output gap is de?ned as the deviation
of output from its equilibrium level in the absence of nominal rigidities. In
this framework, current account imbalances imply permanent wealth changes
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that a¤ect the labour supply. Thus, the steady state level of output is not
the same as what would prevail under perfectly ?exible prices. However, the
output gap is very small in the steady state, as it is some 0.01 percent. Thus,
the non-zero output gap in the steady state is likely to have only a negligible
e¤ect on the results.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
As emphasised, for instance, by Lane (2001b, 261), many results of NOEM
models are sensitive to the choice of parameter values. However, the main
results of this study are not sensitive to the choice of parameter values. The
changes in parameter values do not cause qualitative changes; the conse-
quences on the key results are purely quantitative.
The results of this model can potentially be sensitive to the choice of the
coe¢cients of the monetary policy rule. Thus, I examine the robustness of the
?ndings to changes in these coe¢cients. Assume, for the sake of argument,
that the central banks respond strongly to the deviations of in?ation from
the target (?1 = 1?0, ?2 = 0?5) or to the deviations of output from the
natural level of output (?1 = 0?5, ?2 = 1?0). Figure 4 illustrates the e¤ects
of a technology shock on the money supply and the nominal exchange rate
in these two cases.
Figure 4 shows that if the central banks are more concerned with the out-
put gap than with in?ation, then exchange rate ?uctuations increase. The
intuition behind this result is that if the central banks focus mostly on the
output gap, the responses of the central banks are stronger since the devi-
ations of output from their target levels are higher than the deviations of
in?ation from the in?ation targets. Equation (31) demonstrates that the
higher the (positive) discounted present value of the money supply di¤eren-
tial, the smaller the initial exchange rate appreciation. Equation (34) shows
that the higher the current value of the money supply di¤erential relative
to the expected future value of the di¤erential, the more the exchange rate
appreciates also after the technology shock.
4 Conclusions
This paper examines the consequences of monetary policy on exchange rate
dynamics. In this paper, I propose a simple money supply rule that captures
the main idea that a central bank follows a simple rule and tends to stabilise
in?ation and output at their targeted levels. Shocks to the money supply
rule are an alternative to the basic NOEM analysis of the transmission of
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shocks to the money supply. Whereas a more recent strand of the NOEM
literature has focused on the design of optimal monetary policy rules bringing
about an optimal response to technology shocks, I instead have focused on
the ?positive analysis of monetary policy rules?.
The policy rule proposed here implies that the nominal exchange rate
does not follow a random walk if the economy faces a monetary or technol-
ogy shock. Thus, Papell?s (1984) conclusion that money supply rules can
cause exchange rate undershooting is valid in the NOEM framework. Mon-
etary policy rules can be one reason why the nominal exchange rate tends
to undergo long swings away from the benchmark level. For instance, quan-
titative easing implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve might cause a long
swing in the external value of the dollar.
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Notes
1This literature includes Frenkel (1976), Frankel (1979), Mussa (1979) and Buiter and
Miller (1982); more recent contributions include Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) and
Betts and Devereux (2001).
2Surveys of the NOEM literature are presented by Lane (2001), Lane and Ganelli (2003)
and Corsetti (2007).
3Because the model extends the basic framework, the di¤erences in the results could
be coming partly from the monetary policy rule and partly from the staggered pricing
mechanism itself. However, as shown in Tervala (2010) and in section 3.3, the Calvo-
pricing mechanism does not change the main predictions of the Betts and Devereux (2001)
model.
4The equations for the foreign country are identical to those of the domestic country,
unless they are explicitly discussed.
5The foreign consumer price index is ? ¤? =
·Z ?
0
(?¤? (?) ???)
1¡? ?? +
R 1
? ?? (?)
1¡? ??
¸ 1
1¡?
?
6This literature includes Bachetta and van Wincoop (2000), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Devereux and Engel (2003) and Sutherland (2004).
7The initial level of technology is normalised to unity.
8I simulate the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum
(2001).
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Figure 1: Dynamic e¤ects of a shock to the domestic monetary policy rule
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Figure 2: Responses to a money supply shock compared with a shock to the
money supply rule
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Figure 3: E¤ects of a domestic technology shock under the money supply
rule (?1 = ?2 = 0?5)
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Figure 4: Technology shocks and exchange rate volatility: varying the coef-
?cients of the monetary policy rule
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